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MONEY AND (SHADOW) BANKING: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
MORGAN RICKS*

Introduction
The term "shadow banking" is often used to signify very
different things, so it is helpful to start with a definition. In this
paper, "shadow banking" refers to the activity of issuing very shortterm IOUs and investing the proceeds in longer-term financial assets.
This activity is, of course, the traditional domain of depository
banking. The shadow banking system performs a similar function,
but its short-term liabilities are not formally styled as "deposits."
The short-term IOUs issued by shadow banking entities are
commonly said to be money-like. What does this mean exactly?
Consumers and businesses find it convenient to allocate a portion of
their resources to assets whose value in relation to currency is
extremely stable. Short-term IOUs tend to have this characteristic.
More precisely, they have both very low credit risk and very low
interest-rate risk. Consequently, their price volatility is extremely
low. These instruments function as cash-parking contracts.
Economists sometimes refer to them as "near money" or "private
money."' Financial managers often just call them "cash," and they
are classified as "cash equivalents" for accounting purposes.2 They
offer exceptionally low yields; agents are willing to sacrifice
investment returns for this "moneyness" quality. These short-term
IOUs appear to satisfy an aspect of money demand.
There is a reason for emphasizing this point at the outset.
Shadow banking is a monetary phenomenon, not just a financial one.
This distinction may seem subtle, but it is conceptually significant. It
implies that the shadow banking problem is bound up with the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
'See Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordofiez, Collateral Crises 1 (Jan. 13, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984715
(referring to short-term debt instruments as "private money").
2 FIN.

ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS TT 7-10

(1987).
3

For a more thorough discussion of this proposition, see Morgan Ricks,

Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, I HARv. Bus. L. REv. 75, 89-

97(2011).
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institutional structure of the monetary system. In other words, the
question "what to do about shadow banking" is closely linked to the
question "how should our monetary system be designed."
This paper approaches the shadow banking problem from
this monetary point of view. It does so by means of a simple thought
experiment. The aim is to strip away the inessentials so as to reveal
some of the basic legal-institutional design considerations that attend
the establishment and management of a monetary system. It is the
author's experience that underlying assumptions in this area are
surprisingly divergent and, at any rate, are seldom made explicit in
the shadow banking literature. If this paper merely assists in
surfacing some otherwise unstated assumptions, it will have served
its purpose.
I.

A Simple Monetary System

Imagine an economy with a fiat money system. There is no
paper currency. Instead, money consists of entries in an electronic
database maintained by the government. The database has two
columns. The left-hand column contains unique identifiers for each
agent in the economy. The right-hand column contains non-negative
values-"money-values"-one for each agent. To make a payment,
an agent instructs the government to reduce (debit) his or her moneyvalue and increase (credit) the payee's money-value by an equivalent
amount. There is no such thing as a physical transfer of money. All
payments are made via these bookkeeping entries.
The money-values in this database do not merely "represent"
or "stand for" money. They are money. They do not carry a
redemption option of any kind. They do not default, at least not in
any conventional legal sense. They are not contracts, any more than a
dollar bill is a contract. They have no explicit terms and conditions. It
might initially seem implausible that agents would ascribe value to
these electronic book-entries. But the proposed system is essentially
no different from our existing monetary system, in which people
ascribe value to intrinsically valueless bits of paper. Our hypothetical
system merely substitutes database entries for bits of paper.4
If there is anything mysterious about this system, the mystery
has to do with the phenomenon of fiat money itself-not with its
particular institutional realization in our hypothetical economy. At a

To import a basic concept from the securities field: money in this
hypothetical economy is "uncertificated." See U.C.C. § 8-102(1)(b) (1977).
4
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basic level, fiat money is indeed puzzling. James Tobin, one of the
preeminent monetary theorists of the past century, discussed this
puzzle in his Nobel Prize lecture:
Th[e] quest for the microfoundations of monetary
theory ... is still unfinished. The reason, I think, is

the difficulty of explaining within the basic
paradigms of economic theory why paper that makes
no intrinsic contribution to utility or technology is
held at all and has positive value in exchange for
goods and services. I certainly have no solution to
that deep question, nor do I regard one as
prerequisite to pragmatic monetary theory.5
This article does not purport to shed any light on Tobin's deep
question. Like Tobin, we will take it for granted that fiat money
"works."
The successful management of our hypothetical monetary
system requires a measure of government competence. The
government must possess adequate recordkeeping capabilities, and it
must reliably process debits and credits. Furthermore, the
government will need to establish payment authentication procedures
in order to prevent fraud. These are routinized, processing
functions-"back office" functions, in business jargon. This is not to
say that they are trivial. On the contrary, they require a real
commitment of resources and technology. However, this kind of
commitment appears to be inescapable in any monetary system that
James Tobin, Nobel Memorial Lecture: Money and Finance in the MacroEconomic Process 14 (Dec. 8, 1981) (transcript available at http://www.
nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics/laureates/1981/tobin-lecture.pdt).
6 According to one theory, the government imparts value to fiat money by
requiring that taxes be paid in it. See, e.g., Abba P. Lerner, Money as a
Creature of the State, 37 AM. ECON. REv. 312, 313 (1947) ("The modern
state can make anything it chooses generally acceptable as money and thus
establish its value quite apart from any connection, even of the most formal
kind, with gold or with backing of any kind. It is true that a simple
declaration that such and such is money will not do .

. .

. But if the state is

willing to accept the proposed money in payment of taxes and other
obligations to itself the trick is done."). See also Douglas W. Diamond &
Raghuram G. Rajan, Money in a Theory of Banking, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 30,
36 (2006) (noting that one of the "natural sources of value for money" is
that it "can be used to pay future taxes").
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the state might choose to establish. For example, in a fiat paper
system, paper currency must be printed and physically distributed,
and anti-counterfeiting measures must be established and enforced.
We have seen how transfers of money take place in our
hypothetical economy. But we have neglected the question of money
creation. How does new money come into existence? In one sense,
the answer is obvious. Money is created ex nihilo, by increasing
agents' aggregate money balances. Presumably, however, these
increases do not happen at random. They arise in the context of some
operation. For instance, money might come into existence through
government expenditures. When the government buys a battleship,
compensates a postal worker, or makes a social welfare payment, the
payee receives a credit to his or her money balance. So long as the
government does not debit its own money balance correspondingly,
it has augmented the money supply. These government expenditures
are financed through seigniorage: "revenue" that arises from money
creation.
Of course, there is no necessary connection between the
optimal path of the money supply and the desired level of
government expenditure. What if the optimal growth in the money
supply over a given period were greater than the desired amount of
government spending over that period?7 One alternative would be for
the government simply to exceed its desired level of spending. But
this would be wasteful. The very notion of a "desired" amount of
government spending implies that the government satisfies its policy
objectives at that level. In other words, the government has exhausted
whatever opportunities it has identified to generate positive social
value. Buying more battleships for monetary purposes would divert
resources from other uses. Making larger-than-desired social welfare
payments might undermine incentives for productivity. These
wasteful expenditures would be socially counterproductive.
Does the government have other ways to augment the money
supply, apart from more spending? Consider this option: a "money
split" (analogous to a stock split in corporate finance). The
government could declare that, at the stroke of a computer keyboard,
it has increased everyone's money balance by some proportion, say
five percent. Suddenly, each agent would have a larger nominal
money-value than before. The government seemingly would have
increased the money supply without spending anything.
7 Assume

for now that the government has no outstanding debt, so it cannot
create money through sovereign debt redemptions.
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Unfortunately, there appears to be a serious practical
problem with the money-split strategy. To see why, imagine that, for
whatever reason, some agents expected the government to announce
a money split. At the margin, these agents would seek to accumulate
money in order to profit from the split: they would reduce spending
and/or monetize assets.8 This behavior would tend to reduce
economic activity and exert downward pressure on prices. These
effects, in turn, would further raise expectations of a money split,
causing more agents to hoard money. Thus the money-split policy
generates a perverse, self-fulfilling equilibrium, in which the
expectation of a money split generates the very economic conditions
that the money split is intended to counteract. Other "keystroke"
approaches (such as randomized, electronic "helicopter drops" 9 of
money) are similarly susceptible to incentive problems and likely
social costs.
The point here is simply that, when it comes to changes in
the money supply, the mechanism matters. This is far from an
original insight. In his Nobel Prize lecture, Robert Lucas made this
point explicitly:
From the beginnings of modern monetary theory, in
David Hume's marvelous essays of 1752, Of Money
and Of Interest, conclusions about the effect of
changes in money have seemed to depend critically
on the way in which the change is effected ....
. . . [T]here is something a little magical about the
way that changes in money come about in Hume's
examples. All the gold in England gets
"annihilated." Elsewhere he asks us to "suppose that,
by miracle, every man in Great Britain should have
five pounds slipped into his pocket in one night."
Money changes in reality do not occur by such
means. Is this just a matter of exposition, or should

It is assumed that prices in this economy exhibit some degree of
"stickiness"-a standard explanation for monetary non-neutrality.
9 This well-known term comes from Milton Friedman. See Milton
Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money, in THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF
MONEY AND OTHER ESSAYS

1, 4 (1969).
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we be concerned about it! This turns out to be a
crucial question.
Interestingly, Tobin touched on a similar theme in his own Nobel
lecture:
Too often macro-economic models describe
monetary policy as a stock M whose time path is
chosen autonomously by a central authority, without
clearly describing the operations that implement the
policy. In fact money supplies are changed by
government transactions with the public in which
goods or non-monetary financial assets are
exchanged for money, or by similar transactions
between banks and the non-bank public. What
transactions are the sources of variation of money
stocks makes a difference .... .
Lucas and Tobin are making similar points here-namely, that
monetary adjustments are undertaken within a particular institutional
apparatus, and the apparatus matters. If shadow banking is indeed a
monetary phenomenon, then it needs to be examined within the
context of the broader legal-institutional structure of the monetary
system.
II.

Credit and Distribution

Let's continue with our thought experiment. Recall that the
government has no debt outstanding. It wants to effect a monetary
expansion that exceeds its desired level of spending over some
period. What options are available-apart from wasteful
expenditures, money splits, or electronic helicopter drops?
Consider this alternative: The government could start lending
(or, equivalently, buying bonds). Assume for the moment that the
government is a competent underwriter of credit. It can price loans
accurately. In that case, this method of monetary expansion has
attractive features. When it makes a loan, the government credits the
10Robert E. Lucas Jr., Prize Lecture: Monetary Neutrality 246-47
(Dec. 7,
1995) (transcript available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/
economics/laureates/ 1995/lucas-lecture.pdf) (citations omitted).
I Tobin, supra note 5, at 13.
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borrower's money-value without debiting its own. New money is
now in circulation.12 The government has not spent money wastefully
on real goods and services. Essentially, the government has "rented
out" new money instead of spending it. (For present purposes, it is
useful to think of the credit market as the rental market for
purchasing power.)
This method of money creation opens up another appealing
possibility: the administrative separation of the monetary and fiscal
authorities. We have so far assumed that the fiscal authority creates
money at will to finance its expenditures. However, there is reason to
think that "governments are subject to an inflation bias that stems
from attempts to maintain overly ambitious levels of employment
and/or to finance budget deficits by means of money creation." 3 This
bias furnishes a rationale for a commitment device. Specifically,
monetary policy might be delegated to an independent agency that is
relatively insulated from political pressures.14 This monetary
authority would have a legal mandate of prudent monetary
management, perhaps along the lines of the Federal Reserve's dual
mandate." It would issue money in exchange for loans/bonds in
order to achieve its monetary policy objectives. (Some of this lending

12 The emergence of this institutional technology-the shift from a spending
channel to a lending channel-has a real historical basis. Legal historian
Christine Desan describes how, in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, American colonial governments began to issue paper money
("bills of credit") in direct payment for goods and services. "When public
expenses declined," however, colonial governments "devised a second way
of putting money into circulation. They established public land banks that
lent borrowers paper money on the security of their land." Christine Desan,
From Blood to Profit: Making Money in the Practiceand Imagery of Early
America, 20 J. POL'Y HIST. 26, 28 (2008).
" Alex Cukierman, The Revolution in Monetary Policymaking Institutions,
Vox (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q node/575; see
also CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 181 (2009) (presenting
evidence of the median inflation rate in sixty-six countries from 1500 to
2007 and noting "a clear inflationary bias throughout history").
14 For a theoretical and empirical examination of the relationship between
inflation and central bank independence, see ALEX CUKIERMAN, CENTRAL

BANK STRATEGY,
EVIDENCE (1992).

CREDIBILITY

AND

INDEPENDENCE:

THEORY

AND

15 See Federal Reserve Act § 2A, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006) (articulating the
Federal Reserve's dual mandate of full employment and price stability).
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might be to the government itself, but this is not important for now.)
The government's fiscal arm would have no discretionary control
over the money supply. The fiscal authority would finance its
operations through taxation and borrowing, thereby subjecting itself
to political and market discipline.
Thus the credit market serves as an attractive distribution
channel in our hypothetical monetary system. Under our imagined
institutional design, the path of the money supply need have no
connection at all to the path of government spending. The system is
compatible with a large government (vis-d-vis the size of the
economy) or a small one. The administrative independence of the
monetary authority insulates monetary policy from volatile political
dynamics, mitigating the effect of the government's inflation bias.
The state continues to receive the seigniorage revenues that arise
from money creation, but these revenues are realized over time via
returns on the monetary authority's credit portfolio. This steady and
relatively predictable revenue stream is convenient: It facilitates
short-term fiscal budgeting.
Of course, the efficacy of this monetary system will depend
critically on the monetary authority's skill at credit analysis. If the
monetary authority is a bad credit investor, then resources will be
poorly allocated. This presents a serious problem. We assumed
earlier that the government is proficient at "back office" tasks. Credit
investing, however, is a quintessential "front office" operation. It
requires information-gathering and analytical skills, local knowledge,
and expert judgment. The monetary authority will need to commit
resources to this operation. Even with a substantial commitment by
the state, there may be reason to doubt its capacity to make sound
investment judgments on a consistent basis. Poor credit judgments
will generate resource misallocation and social costs.
This circumstance seems to call for a special institutional
arrangement-one designed to harness market forces. To this end,
the monetary authority might enter into joint-venture agreements
with private managers that have expertise in credit investing. Each
manager would be required to put up some of its own resources as
"skin in the game"-a first-loss equity position. The managers would
be granted the authority to acquire credit assets on behalf of the state.
The sellers or issuers of these credit assets would receive newly
created money (still consisting of entries in the government's
database). When the monetary authority wished to expand the money
supply, it would authorize the managers to acquire more credit assets,
thereby putting new money into circulation.
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The returns from each manager's credit portfolio would be
split between the manager and the monetary authority. Specifically,
each manager would pay a risk-based fee to the state, and the
manager would be entitled to retain any investment returns on its
portfolio in excess of its fee. In effect, the state would own senior
claims on the managers' credit portfolios, and the managers would
hold residual equity claims. The state's net returns from its senior
claims would constitute its seigniorage revenues. If a manager
experienced portfolio losses sufficient to wipe out its equity, the
government would revoke its contract and seize and liquidate its
investment portfolio. The government could mitigate its risk to some
degree by requiring that managers limit their portfolios to the safer
end of the credit spectrum.16
The system described here bears an obvious resemblance to
the one we actually have. These joint ventures are analogous to
depository banks. Like our hypothetical joint ventures, U.S.
depository entities are subject to strict portfolio restrictions, equity
capital requirements, and (through the deposit insurance system)
risk-based fees. They have special charters that permit them to issue
monetary instruments styled as "deposits." Entities without
depository charters are legally prohibited from issuing these
instruments. That is to say, deposit-issuance is a legal privilege.
When a depository bank depletes its equity, the government-via the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") -seizes
and
liquidates it portfolio in satisfaction of the government's senior
claim. Depository banks, then, are engaged in a joint venture with the
government: a public-private partnership. They are licensed agents of
the state, chartered for the efficient distribution of the money supply.
In at least two basic respects, however, the hypothetical
system in our thought experiment differs from the system of money
and banking that exists in the United States today. First, the money
that our hypothetical managers are licensed to distribute is in no
sense a private liability. It is not a contractual promise by the
manager to deliver some other "base" or "high-powered" form of
money.17 Our hypothetical system has not introduced any such
6 Obviously, the licensed managers would not be the only credit investors
in the economy. The credit market share of licensed managers would
depend on the size of the targeted money supply in relation to the size of the
entire credit market.
17 These terms refer to the liabilities of the central bank ("MO"). For a brief
and non-technical introduction, see Anna J. Schwartz, Money Supply, LIBR.
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concept. All money still consists of entries in the government's
database. Accordingly, all money remains sovereign and default-free
in our imagined economy; the notion of government insurance or
guarantees of this money would be superfluous. Second, and
relatedly, there is no central bank. There is a monetary authority that
is responsible for adjusting the money supply, but it has no asset
portfolio of its own that is distinct from the licensed managers'
portfolios. Instead, it prescribes the amount of money that the
licensed managers are permitted to issue, and it adjusts this figure
over time in accordance with its monetary policy objectives. All
money is issued through this outsourcing arrangement.
The key terms of the hypothetical joint venture agreementsportfolio restrictions, equity capital requirements, and risk-based
fees-are complementary. Consider first the risk-based fees. In the
absence of these charges, the managers would earn windfall profits:
They would collect all of the returns from investing newly created
money, but they would not incur any associated funding costs. They
would thereby capture the seigniorage revenues generated by the
monetary system. The risk-based fees are designed to retain these
seigniorage revenues as a public asset. The monetary authority aims
to charge each manager an actuarially fair rate for the government's
senior claim. That is to say, it seeks to replicate the debt financing
costs that the managers would incur if they were to finance their
portfolios exclusively in the capital markets.18
If the monetary authority could price these risk-based fees
with perfect accuracy and update them continuously, then the jointventure agreements would need no additional terms. However, if the
monetary authority were so skilled at valuation, then it would have
had no reason to establish the joint venture regime in the first place.
Thus the government's shortcomings as an investor furnish the basis
for the other components of the joint venture agreements: portfolio
restrictions and capital requirements. Portfolio restrictions seek to
limit the volatility of the asset portfolios that managers accumulate.
Capital requirements provide first-loss protection and incentive
alignment. In combination, these risk constraints serve to counteract
the managers' moral hazard incentives and reduce the risk of loss to
& LIBERTY, http://econlib.org/library/Enc/MoneySupply.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2012).
8 In finance terms, the monetary authority would charge each
manager (1)
the risk-free rate plus (2) a fair risk premium for a put option written on the
manager's portfolio, struck at the quantity of money issued by the manager.
ECON.
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the government, thereby enhancing the regime's efficiency.19 These
terms are analogous to the restrictive covenants that are ubiquitous in
privately negotiated debt and insurance contracts-terms which seek
to constrain risky behavior and provide a layer of first-loss protection
to the underwriter. Thus the components of our hypothetical jointventure system embody a coherent economic logic.
The regime's three components are calibrated sequentially.
First, the monetary authority delineates the universe of credit assets
in which the managers may invest (i.e., portfolio restrictions). The
permissible range of investments will reside at the safer end of the
credit spectrum, but it must be large enough to accommodate the
targeted money supply. Second, the monetary authority establishes
capital requirements. It balances the cost of additional capital
(diversion of investment capital from other projects in the economy)
against its benefit (incentive alignment and first-loss absorption).
Finally, the monetary authority imposes the risk-based fee, the price
of which is determined primarily by the manager's portfolio
volatility and its capital level. Standard option pricing models are
available to assist with this analysis.
To be sure, this institutional design poses serious
implementation challenges. It requires the monetary authority to
make difficult appraisals of value. Any deficiencies in its appraisals
will result in resource misallocation and social costs. However,
challenges of this nature appear to be inescapable in any monetary
regime that the state might choose to establish. For that matter,
valuation problems arise in every government intervention-from
national defense, to antitrust enforcement, to infrastructure
investment, and so on. All of these interventions require the
government to make difficult appraisals of value, and any
deficiencies in its appraisals will result in resource misallocation and
social costs. The establishment of a monetary system turns out to be
no different. As always, the aim is to select the best design from a set
of imperfect alternatives.
19 These requirements reduce the fair value of the put option written by the
monetary authority. There is a zero lower bound on the risk premium (the
government will not charge a negative risk premium). Accordingly, the
lower the fair risk premium, the lower the government's expected
underpricing error. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Morgan

Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability (Harvard John M. Olin

Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 706, 2011), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract 1933890.pdf.
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Monetary Adjustments

It is useful to conclude our thought experiment with an
additional word about monetary adjustments in our hypothetical
system. As noted above, the independent monetary authority
prescribes the amount of money that licensed managers are permitted
to issue. It adjusts this figure over time to suit its monetary policy
objectives. In this regard, we might think of the managers as owning
special permits for money creation. To generate a monetary
expansion, the monetary authority would increase the allowable
number of money-units issuable under each outstanding permit.
Licensed managers would then be entitled to expand their portfolios
by acquiring more credit assets, thereby putting more money into
circulation. A monetary tightening would work the other way around,
requiring managers to reduce new originations relative to maturing
assets, or perhaps even to shed assets in the secondary market. In that
case, existing money is retired. To enhance the regime's efficiency,
the permits could be made tradable among the eligible managers.
The permit mechanism described here has an analogue in our
existing monetary system. Depository banks are required to hold
base money equal to a specified fraction of their outstanding deposit
obligations. 20 These reserve requirements can, of course, serve as a
basic tool of monetary policy. A decrease in required reserves is
expansionary; an increase is contractionary. Depository banks
actively trade these reserves in the federal funds market.2 ' In our
Federal Reserve Act § 19(b), 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2006).
Economist Jeremy Stein, who was recently nominated by President
Obama to join the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has observed that
central bank reserves function as "tradable permits" for money creation.
Stein analogizes reserve requirements to a cap-and-trade system:
20
21

All of this may sound a bit like science fiction; we don't
observe cap-and-trade regulation of banks in the real
world. However if banks' short-term liabilities are subject
to reserve requirements, it turns out that monetary policy
can be used as a mechanism for implementing the capand-trade approach. When the central bank injects
reserves into the system, it effectively increases the
number of permits for private money creation.
Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial-StabilityRegulation, 127
J. ECON. 57, 59 (2012).

Q.
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hypothetical system, monetary policy is conducted entirely through
this permit mechanism. There is no need for the monetary authority
to transact directly in the credit markets. Accordingly, in our
imagined economy, there is a monetary authority, but there is no
central bank.
Finally, one can imagine a problematic scenario under which
managers declined to expand their portfolios despite the availability
of additional permit capacity. In that case, the permits would cease to
act as a binding constraint. This circumstance would arise if
managers were unable to identify additional investment opportunities
with positive net present value (i.e., expected returns in excess of
their costs of funds). The result would be a so-called "liquidity trap."
In seeking to expand the money supply, the monetary authority
would find itself pushing on a string.22
What options would be available under these circumstances?
The monetary authority might turn to "unconventional" monetary
policy, by relaxing managers' portfolio constraints or capital
requirements or by reducing risk-based fees. These steps should
generate additional monetary expansion at the margin, but they
would come at a subsidy cost. Alternatively, the fiscal authority
might seek to pursue macroeconomic objectives by other means, i.e.,
fiscal stimulus. Whether and under what circumstances these types of
approaches might be warranted are topics of debate among
macroeconomists. These questions are far beyond this paper's scope.
Clearly, though, the liquidity trap dilemma is not unique to the
hypothetical monetary system described here.
IV.

Shadow Banking and Monetary Design

Shadow banking is a monetary phenomenon. It involves the
issuance of money-like instruments. Can our thought experiment
shed any light on this activity?
As noted above, our existing system of depository banking
can be understood as a joint venture with the state for the efficient
distribution of the money supply. Depository entities have special
licenses that entitle them to issue monetary instruments styled as
See Paul Krugman, Thinking About the Liquidity Trap, THE OFFICIAL
PAUL
KRUGMAN
WEB
PAGE
(Dec. 1999), http://web.mit.edu/
krugman/www/trioshrt.html ("[T]he long-scorned Keynesian challenge to
22

monetary policy-the claim that it is ineffective at recession-fighting,
because you can't push on a string-has reemerged as a real issue.").
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"deposits." Unlicensed entities are legally prohibited from issuing
these instruments. Most deposits are federally insured; they are
sovereign money. Depository entities are subject to risk-based fees,
strict portfolio limitations, and capital requirements-the key terms
of the joint venture. Central bank reserves function as tradable
permits for deposit issuance, placing the upper bound of the money
supply (insofar as it consists of reservable deposits) under the control
of the monetary authority. Our thought experiment suggested that the
components of this regime reflect a compelling economic logic.
Compare the shadow banking system. Shadow banking
entities are not engaged in any partnership with the state. They issue
money-like instruments, but this activity per se has no legal or
regulatory status. Indeed, very short-term IOUs, as such, are not a
cognizable legal category. Shadow banking entities pay no risk-based
fees to the state. Many of them are unencumbered by meaningful
portfolio restrictions or capital requirements. There are no legal
limits on the quantity of money-like instruments that they are
permitted to issue. Thus the basic terms of the joint venture are
absent.
The shadow banking system might be understood as a
parallel system of private money creation, but the reality is somewhat
more complicated. During the recent financial crisis, the federal
government took extraordinary measures to prevent these
purportedly private instruments from defaulting. Indeed, very nearly
the entire emergency policy response to the crisis was aimed at
preventing the financial system from defaulting on its short-term
liabilities. These "private" IOUs essentially became public
obligations.
The instability of the short-term funding markets is,
arguably, the central problem for financial regulatory policy. Yet
there is reason to doubt that recent and pending financial reforms will
be conducive to stable conditions in these markets. The new Orderly
Liquidation Authority ("OLA"), a centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank
Act, 23 is intended to reduce the collateral damage from financial firm
failures. However, this new tool was not designed to prevent defaults
on money-like instruments, nor does it provide the legal authority to
do so. On the contrary, the FDIC has indicated that, under OLA,
short-term claimants will be subject to impairment "in virtually all
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
23
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cases." 24 It is therefore doubtful whether this new authority can be
effective in forestalling an incipient liquidity crisis. Moreover, the
Dodd-Frank Act has erected significant new obstacles to the
deployment of the panic-fighting tools that were used to stabilize the
short-term funding markets during the recent crisis. Absent future
congressional action, these new constraints may very well impede
emergency stabilization measures during a future liquidity crisis.
Other core aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act-such as the
Volcker Rule, heightened capital and prudential requirements for
systemically important institutions, and derivative market reformsare only tangentially related to the short-term funding markets. They
may reduce instability in the shadow banking system, but only
indirectly and to an uncertain extent. A more direct attempt to
address the shadow banking problem is being undertaken
internationally through the Basel Committee's new Basel III liquidity
standards. 26 However, there are reasons to doubt whether this new
liquidity regime, as designed, can provide a meaningful degree of
stability to the short-term funding markets. First, the new liquidity
regime relies critically on the ability of regulatory authorities to
identify ex ante those capital-market instruments that will remain
highly marketable under panic conditions. Needless to say, this
presents a daunting challenge.2 Second, it is currently contemplated
that large portions of the financial sector will not be subject to these
liquidity requirements. To the extent that there are gaps in coverage,

See Orderly Liquidation Authority Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4207, 4212 (Jan.
25, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 380).
25 For a detailed discussion of these new legal constraints and their
ramifications, see Ricks, supra note 3, at 122-35.
26
See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL
24

FRAMEWORK
MONITORING

FOR LIQUIDITY

RISK

MEASUREMENT,

STANDARDS

AND

1-2 (2010), availableathttp://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl88.pdf.
27 John Maynard Keynes addressed this topic directly. "Of the maxims of
orthodox finance," he wrote, "none, surely, is more anti-social than the
fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part of
investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding of
'liquid' securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of
investment for the community as a whole." JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 155 (First Harvest/
Harcourt 1964) (1936).
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the short-term funding markets can be expected to adapt
accordingly.28
These regulatory approaches all have one thing in common:
They take the existing "private money" system as a given. It is not
obvious why this should be the case. The private money market need
not be taken as a fixed and immutable feature of the financial
landscape. We might instead imagine a regulatory system in which
the issuance of large quantities of short-term IOUs were treated in a
fashion similar to the issuance of deposit obligations: as a legal
privilege. Such an approach would take the "moneyness" of shortterm IOUs seriously. It would embrace a more expansive conception
of what constitutes money-transcending our formalistic and
anachronistic focus on deposits.
In prior work, the author has proposed a sovereign money
system whose outlines resemble the joint-venture system described
above. 29 The proposed regime would largely confine the issuance of
money-like instruments-including, but not limited to, deposit
obligations-to a designated set of licensed firms. These licensed
issuers would be required to abide by portfolio restrictions and
capital requirements, and they would pay risk-based fees to the
Furthermore, it is an open question whether these liquidity standards will
in fact be implemented internationally at anything resembling the originally
contemplated level of stringency. According to a recent news report:
28

Policy makers and regulators in the European Union are
weighing whether to permit banks to hold a broader
variety of assets to meet new [liquidity] standards. ...
Leading banks in France, Germany, Spain and the U.K.
are now pushing regulators to allow a wider range of
assets-everything from gold to blue-chip stocks to
mortgage-backed securities-to satisfy the buffers. ...
There are signs that the banks' pleas are gaining traction
with some officials. European regulators and central
bankers say they have grown increasingly worried in
recent weeks that overly stringent liquidity requirements
could force banks to rapidly shrink by constraining their
lending, a development that could harm the Continent's
fragile economies.
David Enrich, EU Banks: Give Us Leeway on Assets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,
2012, at C1.
29 See Ricks, supra note 19, at I (proposing a "public-private partnership"
framework for the issuance of money and money-like instruments).
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monetary authority. They would issue sovereign money. Unlicensed
financial firms, on the other hand, would be prohibited from funding
their operations with money-like instruments (de minimis exceptions
would not be problematic). In practical terms, unlicensed firms
would be required to "term out" their funding structures, i.e., finance
themselves exclusively in the debt and equity capital markets, not the
money market. Experience suggests that termed-out financial firms
are amenable to ordinary bankruptcy proceedings; they can default
without incident. Accordingly, under the proposed regulatory system,
unlicensed financial firms would be ineligible for public support in
the event of distress. The proposed regime, then, would bring an end
to the shadow banking business model. It would establish the money
supply as a public good: All money would be sovereign and defaultfree.
To be sure, this sovereign money approach presents
significant implementation challenges. And the historical record of
publicly-backed money (deposit insurance) in the United States is not
unblemished. The savings and loan debacle of the 1980s and early
1990s was a notable and costly stumble. 30 However, it is worth
noting that, in the years preceding the S&L episode, depository
regulation in the United States was seriously flawed. A rigorous
capital regime did not exist until 1988,3' and risk-based deposit
insurance premiums were not introduced until 1991.32 Furthermore,
prior to 1991, the FDIC was not legally required to resolve critically
undercapitalized depository institutions on a prompt basis. Problems
were left to fester for years.

The S&L episode cost U.S. taxpayers about $124 billion. See Timothy
Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 33 (2000). This is a large figure,
but it must be considered in context. Gary Gorton and others have given the
deposit insurance system significant credit for the unprecedented period of
panic-free financial conditions that prevailed in the United States from 1934
to 2008. See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC
OF 2007, at 54 (2010).
30

BASEL
COMM.
ON
BANKING
SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 1
31

(1988), availableat http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbscl I 1.pdf.
32 The FDIC has employed risk-based deposit insurance fees since 1992, as
required by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA), Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 302(a)-(b), 105 Stat. 2236, 2345-49
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(b)-(c)).
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By the time of the recent financial crisis, Congress had
significantly improved the design of U.S. depository regulation. And
it is noteworthy that, despite the staggering magnitude of credit
impairments in the United States from 2008 to 2010, no taxpayer
support of the deposit insurance system was required. Total bank
failure costs to the FDIC's deposit insurance fund as a result of the
recent crisis are estimated to be around $100 billion. These losses
are being fully recouped from the insured depository sector, whose
reported equity capital currently stands at $1.6 trillion.34 In short, the
deposit insurance system has done more or less what it was designed
to do.
The monetary aspects of the shadow banking problem have
been relatively neglected in the ongoing debates over financial
regulatory reform. This may have been a mistake. Shadow banking is
a monetary phenomenon, and monetary institutions, like all legal
institutions, stand in need of design. Arguably, the critical question
for financial regulation today is whether our existing system of
"private money" is compatible with stable monetary and financial
conditions. If it is not-and there are compelling reasons to think that
this is the case-then a sovereign money system may be worthy of
further study.

Specifically, the FDIC's deposit insurance fund incurred $79 billion in
bank failure costs in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and another $19 billion in costs
as projected from 2011 through 2015. See Memorandum from Arthur J.
Murton, Dir., Div. of Ins. and Research, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to the Bd.
of Dirs. of the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 4 (Sept. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/201 IOctno4.pdf.
34 See Ross Waldrop, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking Profile:
Third Quarter2011, 5 FDIC Q. 1, 5 tbl. Il-A (2011).
33

